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What normative facts should political theory be about? 
Philosophy of science meets political liberalism 
Christian List and Laura Valentini* 
Abstract 
Just as different sciences deal with different facts—say, physics versus biology—so we may 
ask a similar question about normative theories. Is normative political theory concerned 
with the same normative facts as moral theory or different ones? By developing an analogy 
with the sciences, we argue that the normative facts of political theory belong to a higher—
more coarse-grained—level than those of moral theory. The latter are multiply realizable by 
the former: competing facts at the moral level can underpin the same facts at the political 
one. Consequently, some questions that moral theories answer are indeterminate at the 
political level. This proposal offers a novel interpretation of John Rawls’s idea that, in public 
reasoning, we should abstract away from comprehensive moral doctrines. We contrast our 
distinction between facts at different levels with the distinction between admissible and 
inadmissible evidence and discuss some implications for the practice of political theory. 
1. Introduction 
We are familiar with the idea that different theories in the sciences deal with different classes 
of facts: they have, in that sense, different ontologies. For example, fundamental physics 
deals with facts about particles, fields, and forces; biology deals with facts about cells, 
organisms, and ecosystems; and the social sciences deal with facts about people and various 
social phenomena. The ontologies of these different sciences are related—social-scientific 
and biological facts depend on physical ones, for instance—but they are not the same. The 
ontologies of “higher-level” theories are more coarse-grained than those of “lower-level” 
theories. Biology and the social sciences, to take our example, abstract away from 
microphysical details. They are not committed to any particular such details. Instead, they 
deal with facts about certain higher-level entities and properties. Similarly, we may ask 
whether different normative theories, specifically moral and political ones, are concerned 
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with different classes of facts. In particular, do moral and political theories deal with the 
same normative facts, or with different ones? Do they have different ontologies?  
Of course, normative theories do not deal with empirical or positive facts, like the 
sciences, but with normative ones: facts about what is permissible, impermissible, right, 
wrong, desirable, undesirable, and so on. We understand normative facts broadly, to include 
both “deontic” facts (facts about what is obligatory or permissible) and “evaluative” facts 
(facts about what is good, bad, desirable, etc.). Reference to such facts need not be 
metaphysically suspicious. On most interpretations—setting aside some strong anti-realist 
ones—normative theories are intended to capture certain normative facts. This leaves open 
whether those facts are independently given, natural or non-natural, humanly constructed, 
and if so how, universal or relative to some standpoint, and so on. 
So, do moral and political theories deal with the same normative facts, or different 
ones? Here are two common answers (cf. Larmore 2013): 
• The domain view: Political and moral theories are concerned with the same 
normative facts. They just address different questions in light of them: moral theories 
focus on individual conduct, political theories on institutional design and social 
organization. In other words, political theories explore what morality implies for 
political questions: for instance, what forms of social organization would be 
recommended by utilitarianism, prioritarianism, Kantianism, and so on. This view 
about the nature of moral and political theory was arguably held by Robert Nozick 
(e.g., 1974) and G. A. Cohen (e.g., 2008). 
• The core-value view: Political and moral theories are concerned with different 
normative facts, in light of their different core values. Moral theories focus on facts 
about what is right, just, and good. Political theories focus on facts about legitimacy, 
order, and stability. Political realists, in Bernard Williams’s tradition (e.g., 2005), 
arguably hold this view (cf. Rossi and Sleat 2014). 
Our aim is to defend a third, principled way of distinguishing between the ontologies of 
moral and political theories:   
• The levels view: Political and moral theories are concerned with different normative 
facts, which belong to different ontological levels. The normative facts of political 
theory belong to a higher—more coarse-grained—ontological level than those of 
moral theory. Normative political facts are “multiply realizable” by moral facts, so 
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that competing facts at the moral level can underpin the same facts at the political 
one. Consequently, some normative questions on which we tend to assume the 
existence of facts at the moral level are indeterminate at the political level. 
Normative political ontology is thinner than moral ontology. 
Our development of this view builds on a hitherto overlooked analogy with the sciences. 
We argue that, despite interpretational differences, the relationship between the moral level 
and the political one is structurally similar to the relationship between a lower level and a 
higher level in the empirical sciences.  
Although our analysis draws on this philosophy-of-science background and is a little 
outside the box, the picture we propose fits well with liberal political theory. The suggestion 
that political theories are associated with a thin ontology of normative facts echoes John 
Rawls’s idea, expressed in Political Liberalism (1996), that at the political level we should 
abstract away from any comprehensive moral doctrines. However, there is much 
disagreement among political theorists on how to understand this idea. We make no claims 
about whether our proposal is faithful to Rawls’s own view; our aim is not exegesis. But we 
suggest that it offers a plausible (re)interpretation of the ontology of political liberalism and 
of the demarcation between comprehensive and political morality. A key implication of our 
proposal is that full-blown moral realism—the thesis that all normative questions have 
determinate “true”/“false” answers—is not defensible at the political level. Only a thinner 
set of normative questions—“political” ones—have determinate answers at that level.  
In Section 2, we outline a framework for thinking about levels. In Sections 3 and 4, 
we bring this framework to bear on the relationship between the ontologies of moral and 
political theory, and we contrast our distinction between facts at different levels (an ontic 
distinction) with the more familiar distinction between admissible and inadmissible 
evidence (an epistemic distinction). In Sections 5 to 7, we describe the virtues of the levels 
view from a liberal perspective and discuss some implications for the practice of political 
theory. 
We should emphasize that, in drawing a distinction between the ontologies of moral 
and political theory, we are proposing a particular meta-theoretical account of how political 
theory should be done. Not everyone will agree with this account, and we do not mean to 
suggest that others could not reasonably prefer different conceptions of political theory. 
However, our account should be congenial to those who share the particular liberal view 
about the point and purpose of political theory we discuss in Section 5. 
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2. The framework of levels 
We begin with some background on how the positive sciences depict the world and the 
sense in which different sciences operate at different levels of description. For the moment, 
we set aside anything related to moral and political theory, to which we will return 
subsequently. The framework sketched in this section draws on List (2018). 
2.1. Scientific explanation and levels of description  
Even though it is widely accepted that, from a scientific perspective, the world is ultimately 
governed by physical laws, it is also widely accepted that fundamental physics by itself is 
insufficient for explaining and making sense of the world. While fundamental physics can 
explain some basic features of the world, such as the behaviour of elementary particles, 
forces, and fields, it cannot adequately explain many other, higher-level phenomena. Special 
sciences such as biology, psychology, and the social sciences are needed to make sense of 
them. We would get overwhelmed with an unnecessary volume of detail and a 
computational overload if we tried to explain biological, psychological, or social 
phenomena in microphysical terms: we wouldn’t see the forest for the trees (see, e.g., 
Putnam 1967, Fodor 1974, Owens 1989, and List and Spiekermann 2013). Even chemical 
explanations must set aside certain microphysical details. To explain chemical, biological, 
psychological, and social phenomena, we must employ higher-level descriptions, which 
abstract away from fundamental physical underpinnings and invoke a different, higher-level 
repertoire of concepts and categories. Microphysical concepts such as quarks, bosons, and 
leptons are absent in biology and the social sciences; instead, we speak about cells, 
organisms, and institutions. 
Higher-level descriptions are more coarse-grained than lower-level descriptions: a 
variety of different lower-level configurations can each realize or instantiate the same 
higher-level phenomenon. This is a by-product of the process of abstraction. For example, 
different combinations of micro-states of the individual water molecules in a water tank can 
each realize the same macro-state of liquid water at a particular temperature. A temperature 
of 80 degrees Celsius can be realized by an astronomical number of different micro-
configurations of molecules. We say that the higher-level phenomenon—here, water at 80 
degrees Celsius—is “multiply realizable” at the lower level (Putnam 1967, Fodor 1974). 
If we want to explain how a steam engine works, for example, the macro-states of 
the water are much more relevant than the micro-states. It matters that water turns into steam 
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when heated and that the pressure is such-and-such, but we need not describe the micro-
states of the billions of water molecules involved (see, e.g., Jackson and Pettit 1990). A 
specification of those micro-states is not only unnecessary for an adequate explanation of 
the steam engine, but even distracting. Similarly, if we want to explain the population 
dynamics in an ecosystem, the appropriate level of description is the biological one, not the 
level of the underlying elementary particles. Good scientific methodology mandates that we 
explain the phenomena in question in the simplest possible way. Often, higher-level 
explanations are simpler than lower-level ones, as illustrated by the examples of the steam 
engine and population dynamics.  
In fact, higher-level explanations are often not just simpler than lower-level ones, 
but they also pick up regularities that cannot be found at the lower level. It is a striking fact 
about the world that it displays regularities at more than one level. There are not only micro-
physical regularities, but also regularities at various macroscopic levels—such as biological, 
psychological, and social ones—which are robust to changes in their lower-level 
realizations (see, e.g., Dennett 1991 and List and Menzies 2009). For instance, the way in 
which the price of a good depends on the supply and demand is independent of the detailed 
physical nature of the good, the structure of the economy, and the currency in question. The 
laws of supply and demand apply irrespective of whether the economy is a traditional 
agricultural economy and money takes the form of gold or whether it is an advanced 
industrial economy in which money is electronic and virtual. Those same economic laws 
apply even in informal prison economies where cigarettes play the role of cash (Radford 
1945). 
2.2. From levels of description to ontological levels 
The point we have made so far is a basic one about scientific explanation: we employ 
different levels of description for different explanatory purposes, where higher-level 
descriptions involve different concepts and categories than lower-level ones and are more 
coarse-grained, deliberately abstracting away from lower-level details. At first sight, one 
might think that this is merely an epistemological point: our cognitive limitations as human 
beings, such as our limited knowledge and limited computational capacities, lead us to focus 
on macroscopic data and to ignore microscopic foundations when we explain certain 
phenomena. 
However, one may coherently and plausibly interpret the different levels of 
description in science as markers of different ontological levels (List 2018). The idea can 
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be summarized as follows. Because different levels of description provide different 
conceptual schemes for thinking and speaking about the world, they carve up the world in 
different ways; they pick out different “real patterns” (Dennett 1991). Each level of 
description thus allows us to refer to a specific class of facts. We call these the “facts at that 
level”. At a biological level, for instance, we refer to facts about organisms and ecosystems, 
but not to facts about the underlying quantum-mechanical processes. The latter can be 
described only using the resources of fundamental physics, and so they belong to a lower 
level. At a macroeconomic level, we refer to facts about macroeconomic properties, such as 
inflation, unemployment, and growth, but not to facts about the detailed psychological 
processes in the minds of individual market participants. The latter can be described only 
using the resources of microeconomics or psychology, and so they belong to a lower level.  
It might be objected that although we talk about macro-level facts—e.g., biological, 
medical, chemical, and social ones—these are just ways of speaking and do not entail any 
ontological commitments. The only “real reality” is to be found at the most fundamental, 
microphysical level. This, the objection suggests, is what we should conclude if we 
subscribe to Occam’s Razor principle—the principle that tells us not to multiply ontological 
commitments unnecessarily. 
One can give at least three responses to this objection. First, Occam’s Razor 
principle only says that we should not make ontological commitments when these are 
explanatorily unnecessary. But as we noted earlier, positing facts at the higher level is 
explanatorily useful, often even indispensable. Most macroscopic phenomena cannot be 
explained without referring to higher-level facts. So, Occam’s Razor principle does not 
speak against higher-level ontological commitments. Second, the burden of proof falls on 
the objector. The existence of higher-level facts is part of our ordinary understanding of 
reality. We talk about chemical compounds, plants, organisms, books, money, companies, 
economies, and states, and we think of them as real phenomena, about which we can 
establish facts. Denying the existence of these facts flies in the face of scientific practice as 
well as common sense. That we talk about them using the vocabulary of certain special 
sciences, rather than that of fundamental physics, makes them no less real. The objector 
would have to explain how we can make sense of the macroscopic world without 
recognizing such higher-level facts. Third, the jury is still out on whether there is a 
fundamental level at all. Perhaps the world can be understood in ever-more fine-grained 
ways, and we will never hit rock bottom (Schaffer 2003). In case there is no fundamental 
level, every level can be viewed as being a higher level, relative to some other, lower levels. 
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2.3. Possible worlds at different levels 
It is helpful to think of about the relationship between different levels in terms of the idea 
of possible worlds. Each level of description gives us a particular way of specifying what 
the world is like. The term “possible world” normally stands for a full specification of the 
way the world might be: the totality of facts. As Wittgenstein (1922) famously put it, “the 
world is everything that is the case.” Now, once we recognize that facts can be associated 
with different levels, we must conclude that possible worlds can also be specified at different 
levels. A “possible world at a particular level” is a full specification of the facts at that level. 
Adjusting Wittgenstein’s dictum, we get the following level-relativized variant: “the world 
at a particular level is everything that is the case at that level” (List 2018). So, a physical-
level world is a full specification of the physical-level facts; a chemical-level world is a full 
specification of the chemical-level facts; a biological-level world is a full specification of 
the biological facts; and so on. Physical descriptions speak about the world at the physical 
level; chemical descriptions speak about the world at the chemical level; and so on. In short, 
instead of speaking about “worlds simpliciter”, the various sciences, in effect, speak about 
“worlds at a particular level”.  
Higher-level worlds are more coarse-grained than lower-level worlds, in that they 
specify a thinner set of facts. Each higher-level world corresponds to an entire equivalence 
class of lower-level worlds: its possible lower-level realizers. For instance, each chemical-
level world corresponds to the equivalence class of all physical-level worlds that could 
realize it and that are, therefore, equivalent with respect to chemical properties. Similarly, 
each world at the macroeconomic level corresponds to the equivalence class of all the 
microeconomic worlds that may realize it and that are therefore macroeconomically 
equivalent. The relationship between lower-level worlds and higher-level worlds is one of 
“supervenience with multiple realizability”: there exists a many-to-one correspondence 
between lower-level worlds and higher-level worlds.1  
We can think of a possible world at a particular level as determining the truth-values 
(“true”, “false”) of all sentences or statements at that level; so, a lower-level world 
determines the truth-values of all lower-level sentences or statements, while a higher-level 
world determines the truth-values of all higher-level sentences or statements. Since higher-
                                               
1 If W and W′ are the sets of all possible worlds at the lower and higher levels, respectively, then each world 
in W′ corresponds to the equivalence class of worlds in W that could realize it. This is precisely developed in 
List (2018). 
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level worlds are more coarse-grained than lower-level worlds, the truth-values of many 
lower-level sentences or statements are left open by higher-level worlds. At the higher level, 
there is no fact of the matter about those lower-level sentences or statements: they are 
indeterminate at that level. For example, a possible world at the level of statistical mechanics 
determines the truth-values of sentences about the temperature and other aggregate states of 
a liquid, but not of sentences about the micro-configurations of the underlying molecules. 
A world at the level of macroeconomics determines the truth-values of sentences about 
inflation and unemployment, but not of sentences about the activities of each individual 
market participant. Another way of expressing this point is to say that higher-level worlds 
are more abstract than lower-level worlds: they omit certain facts that are filled in only by 
their lower-level realizers. With this philosophy-of-science background in place, we return 
to the topic of moral and political theory. 
3. The levels view about political and moral ontology 
The present framework allows us to clarify the relationship between the ontologies of moral 
and political theory.2 Political theory, we suggest, can be associated with a different level 
of description and a different body of normative facts than moral theory. Specifically, moral 
theory operates at a more fine-grained level than political theory. This means, in particular, 
that political theories have a thinner normative ontology and thinner truth-conditions than 
moral theories, while moral theories have a richer normative ontology and richer truth-
conditions. 
This insight is arguably implicit in Rawls’s Political Liberalism (1996), and so we 
will develop it by reference to Rawls. As noted, however, our aim is not exegetical, and if 
what we offer is a revisionary re-interpretation of Rawls, then we have no problem with 
that. Recall the following claims from Political Liberalism:  
• The negative claim: At the political level, we should not take a stand on the core 
concerns of comprehensive moral and religious doctrines—for instance, what a 
person is, what makes something valuable, what fundamentally explains the 
rightness or wrongness of an action. 
• The positive claim: Normative political questions, especially about how to organize 
the basic structure of society, should be answered by reference to freestanding 
                                               
2 For an earlier, but different application of levelled thinking to political theory, see Carter (2015), who uses 
grounding hierarchies to investigate value-freeness and value-neutrality in political concepts. 
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political principles, namely principles that do not presuppose the truth of any 
particular comprehensive moral doctrine. 
• The “overlapping consensus” claim: The answers to normative political questions—
including the freestanding political principles—should be compatible with a variety 
of comprehensive moral doctrines and supported by an overlapping consensus 
among them. 
These claims can be explicated through the framework of levels. We will employ the idea 
of “possible worlds at different levels”, but we will understand “worlds” for present 
purposes not as specifications of positive facts, but as specifications of normative facts. In 
particular, we will define a “possible normative world” as a specification of the totality of 
normative facts, as posited by some normative theory. Under this definition, different 
normative theories disagree about which normative world is actual: which encodes the 
“true” or “correct” set of normative facts. By positing different rightness or wrongness facts, 
for example, Kantian and utilitarian theories give us different accounts of what the 
normative facts are, thereby depicting different possible normative worlds as actual. The 
“levels view” asserts the following claims: 
• Possible normative worlds can be specified at different levels of grain. The set of 
possible normative worlds at the political level is more coarse-grained than the one 
at the comprehensive moral level. A normative political theory specifies a thinner 
set of normative facts than a comprehensive moral doctrine.    
• Normative political questions should be answered at the political level, not the moral 
one. By implication, there are questions addressed by comprehensive moral 
doctrines on which there is no political fact of the matter, hence no “normative 
political truth”. Those questions are indeterminate at the political level. 
• Any “normative political truth” may be compatible with a variety of “moral truths”. 
Political-level truths can, in this sense, be multiply realized at the comprehensive 
moral level. By implication, competing comprehensive moral doctrines, which take 
incompatible moral-level worlds to be actual, can agree on the same normative 
world at the political level. The competing moral-level worlds can then be viewed 
as different possible “realizers” of the same normative political-level world. (This 
multiple-realizability claim must not be confused with the more trivial claim that the 
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same normative political principles may be satisfied by a variety of different 
behaviours, policies, or institutions, which is obviously the case.3) 
On the levels view, in line with Political Liberalism, certain political principles may be 
supported by a variety of comprehensive moral doctrines. Think of how many different 
comprehensive moral doctrines may be able to agree that we ought to make collective 
decisions in a deliberative democratic manner, that we ought to respect a certain system of 
basic rights and liberties and avoid extreme socio-economic inequality, and that we ought 
to have a humane criminal justice system. In this way, utilitarians, Kantians, Aristotelians, 
and Scanlonian contractualists, among others, may agree on the same set of political 
principles for governing the basic structure of society, even if they offer competing 
comprehensive moral foundations for those principles. At the political level, there is a fact 
of the matter about which political principles are the correct ones—for instance, which 
liberties and entitlements citizens should have—but there is no fact of the matter about the 
correct comprehensive moral foundations for those principles, such as whether 
utilitarianism, Kantianism, or some other moral doctrine is true. This is analogous to our 
earlier point that, at the macro-physical level, there is a fact of the matter about whether 
water in a kettle is boiling, but no fact about the precise micro-states of all the underlying 
water molecules. Similarly, there is no political-level fact about whether human beings are 
created in the image of God, whether one ought to confess in order to go to Heaven, and 
whether one ought to adhere to the Categorical Imperative in one’s personal life. Those 
questions are settled only at the comprehensive moral level. 
 This does not imply that all moral facts are absent from the political level. Rather, 
those moral facts on which all relevant competing comprehensive moral doctrines agree, 
such as the fact that—in standard situations—killing innocent people is wrong, still hold at 
the political level. So, the most non-controversial portion of morality is preserved at the 
political level. That is the portion of morality on which there is an overlapping consensus 
among all the relevant competing comprehensive moral doctrines. We can think of the 
normative facts that lie within this overlap as coarse-grained moral facts that are multiply 
                                               
3 “Realization”, in our discussion of “multiple realizability”, refers to the instantiation or grounding of some 
higher-level fact in some configuration of lower-level facts, not to the fulfilment of whatever it is that certain 
normative principles require of individuals and/or society. We thank David Estlund for prompting us to clarify 
this point.  
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realizable. Such facts are settled even at the political level, although their comprehensive 
normative foundations are left open.4 
How to define the set of possible normative worlds at the political level and which 
such world is the “correct” one—in the sense of specifying the correct body of normative 
facts at the political level—are further questions, which must be discussed separately. Our 
focus up to this point has been on the structure of the levels view. We have explained how 
one can draw the distinction between moral facts and normative political facts in a levelled 
framework. That said, our interest is in specifying the two levels in a way that is consistent 
with a liberal outlook. So, what we are proposing is a liberal version of the levels view. 
4. Inadmissible facts versus inadmissible evidence 
One might think that the idea of treating certain issues as indeterminate at the political level 
is similar to the familiar idea that certain evidence is not admitted in the courtroom, such as 
evidence that was acquired in a procedurally incorrect way. The legal rules of evidence may 
exclude such evidence from consideration even if, privately, a rational agent would consider 
it epistemically relevant; that is to say, the evidence could lead to an opinion change in a 
rational agent who had access to it. The problem with such evidence is not its epistemic 
irrelevance, but its legal inadmissibility.  
Perhaps, then, what the levels view suggests is that political theorizing is analogous 
to the activity of legal reasoning in the courtroom, namely governed by certain rules of 
evidence, which specify which evidence is admissible and which is not. Though tempting, 
this is the wrong way to think about the levels view. We must distinguish between two 
theses: 
• the thesis that certain kinds of evidence are inadmissible in certain contexts; 
• the thesis that at a particular level of description we can only invoke facts at the 
relevant level and not facts at other levels, especially lower-level facts. 
The first thesis characterizes legal reasoning in the courtroom (Rawls 1996, p. 221). But it 
is the second that characterizes political theorizing, according to the levels view. Note that 
the first thesis is epistemic: its sole concern is the question of which evidence we may use 
                                               
4 The fact that political-level discourse and moral-level discourse overlap in some of their terms (such as the 
use of notions like permissibility, obligation, right, wrong etc.) does not undermine the claim that the totality 
of normative facts at the political level is thinner (more coarse-grained) than the totality of normative facts at 
the comprehensive moral level. 
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in certain contexts. The second thesis is ontic: it is concerned with the facts of the matter 
we may posit. (For discussion of a more epistemic view, see Estlund 2012, p. 271.) 
Deeming some evidence inadmissible—for instance, evidence gained through a 
forced confession—is not the same as refraining from positing a relevant fact of the matter. 
In a criminal trial, we certainly assume that there are facts about who did it, how and when 
they did it, who may have helped them, what their motives were, and so on. For this reason, 
we seek to establish those facts on the basis of the best evidence we have. Sometimes we 
cannot reliably know all the facts, or there may be restrictions on the evidence we may use, 
such as when some evidence was gathered in an inadmissible way. But the existence of the 
facts themselves is not in question. 
By contrast, at the political level, the reason why we should refrain from considering, 
for instance, religious testimony is not merely that such evidence is inadmissible while we 
may still assume that there are religious facts, albeit ones we may not conclusively know. 
Rather, our reason for not considering religious testimony is that, at the political level, we 
cannot assume the existence of religious facts in the first place. Similarly, we should not 
assume the truth of atheism for political purposes. At the political level, we should not take 
a stand on this issue at all: we should treat the issue as indeterminate. At the comprehensive 
moral level, we can assume that there is a fact of the matter. Moral theories can in principle 
have religious or metaphysical commitments. But the comprehensive moral level is not the 
one at which political theorizing should be conducted, according to the levels view. 
By analogy, consider whether religious testimony should be considered in medicine. 
Imagine a patient asking a doctor whether to pray to attain spiritual salvation. Presumably, 
the doctor would say that this question is outside the domain of medicine: there is no medical 
fact on this matter. It is not that there is a medical fact, but the relevant evidence is 
inadmissible. If that were the case, the medical profession would have to approach the issue 
as an instance of decision-making under uncertainty. It might then be appropriate for doctors 
to try to give the best advice under the uncertainty, for instance by invoking Pascal’s wager 
argument. If God exists, praying might lead to spiritual salvation, not praying to a worse 
outcome; and if God does not exist, praying would not be much of a sacrifice anyway; so 
perhaps praying is all-things-considered advisable. But doctors do not give this advice. In 
fact, we would be suspicious of any medical professional who engaged in such reasoning. 
What this suggests is this. On our established views about the proper domain of medicine, 
there is no medical fact about religious matters, simpliciter. That is why religious testimony 
is not relevant to medicine. By contrast, there are facts about religious matters in theology, 
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and religious testimony is relevant to theological investigations. Analogously, the levels 
view asserts that, when we engage in normative argumentation at the political level, we 
must not presuppose that there is a fact of the matter about the existence of God, spiritual 
salvation, and other comprehensive moral questions. In sum, the distinction between 
admissible and inadmissible facts, as drawn by the levels view, is different from the 
distinction between admissible and inadmissible evidence, as familiar from the courtroom. 
5. Why should we accept the levels view? 
So far, we have introduced the levels view and have used it to distinguish between the 
ontologies of moral and political theory, taking Rawls’s Political Liberalism as inspiration. 
We now want to show that the levels view, in the Rawlsian liberal version we propose, has 
a number of attractive features. In particular, we suggest that it satisfies three key desiderata 
that—we think—any good account of normative political ontology should meet: 
1. Consistency with the aim of political theorizing: Political theory should answer the 
question of how to live together under circumstances of pluralism. 
2. Consistency with the core liberal conviction that “you can’t push people around in 
the name of what you think is right” (Korsgaard 2008, p. 318): Public decisions, 
which may be informed by political theory, should not be based on reasonably 
contested moral or religious views, even if one believes them to be correct. 
3. Consistency with Occam’s Razor principle: In any domain of inquiry, one should 
not posit more, nor fewer, facts than necessary to account for the relevant evidence. 
Given space constraints, we are not able to show that the levels view is the only account of 
normative political ontology that satisfies those three desiderata, but our discussion should 
show, at least, that the levels view satisfies them in a clear and compelling way. Of course, 
the desiderata themselves are not uncontroversial. For instance, supporters of G.A.-Cohen-
style, fact-free political theorizing are likely to reject Desideratum 1, which presupposes a 
more practical understanding of the aim of political theorizing (e.g., Cohen 2008). 
Desideratum 2 may be rejected by those who find liberal principles unconvincing and also 
by those who defend respect for persons’ liberties on comprehensive—e.g., autonomy-
promoting—grounds (e.g., Raz 1986; for discussion, see Nussbaum 2011). Desideratum 3 
should be fairly uncontroversial. The less readers are convinced by our desiderata, the less 
they will be convinced by our version of the levels view. Still, the desiderata are sufficiently 
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widely accepted to make our exploration worthwhile. Moreover, even the acceptance of one 
or two of the desiderata would lend some support to the levels view. 
5.1. Consistency with the aim of political theory 
As Rawls noted, in a pluralistic society, stable and peaceful cooperation is hardly possible 
if disagreeing parties insist on imposing their comprehensive views on one another (Rawls 
1996, pp. 140-144). The levels view, by prescribing political agnosticism regarding 
comprehensive moral doctrines, rules out the legitimacy of such imposition from the start.  
In response, one might suggest that peace and stability could be obtained through 
autocracy, thereby suppressing pluralism. However, this option is not only morally 
reprehensible—certainly from a liberal perspective—but also pragmatically dubious. The 
costs involved in suppressing pluralism would be extremely high, and it is not clear how 
successful or sustainable such suppression could be, even setting aside its immorality. To a 
lesser extent, the same could also be said about an approach that imposes a relatively benign 
but still comprehensive moral doctrine on society as a whole. The answers given to 
normative questions by such an approach would be unlikely to convince the proponents of 
other comprehensive moral doctrines. By contrast, the levels view is set up to accommodate 
the circumstances of pluralism, and it gives us a principled methodology for answering 
normative political questions under such circumstances. So, the levels view fits the aim of 
political theorizing in contemporary societies. 
5.2. Consistency with core liberal convictions 
The levels view clearly accommodates the conviction that one ought not to impose one’s 
reasonably contested views on others. To develop this point, we need to say more about the 
nature of moral disagreement. In moral discourse, we ask questions such as the following:  
• How ought we to act, or not to act?  
• Why ought we to act in that way? 
Answers to the first question typically take the form of verdicts about permissibility and 
obligation. Answers to the second typically refer to the underlying values or reasons. 
Philosophers, and people in general, notoriously disagree on both questions. These 
disagreements are largely intractable: there is no publically accepted procedure for resolving 
them (Waldron 1998). For some people, the answer to moral questions lies in religion, for 
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others it lies in intuition, for still others it lies in rational deliberation, and so on. None of 
the people in question are obviously mistaken or irrational. They are responsive to evidence 
on empirical matters, and their thinking is coherent. Furthermore, despite their moral 
disagreements, their views may all be compatible with basic liberal principles. As Rawls 
puts it, they may all qualify as “reasonable”, in a moralized sense of the term (more on this 
in Section 6; on ambiguities in Rawls’s notion of reasonableness, see Nussbaum 2011, Sect. 
IV). 
In the face of intractable moral disagreements, liberals typically acknowledge that 
they may not unilaterally impose their contested views on others, for instance through state 
coercion.5 Such imposition would be contrary to the core liberal commitment to respect for 
persons as free and equal agents (on the “respect” principle, see Larmore 1999). In Martha 
Nussbaum’s words, “it is especially violative of persons to impose a scheme of value upon 
them” (2011, p. 20). The levels view captures this tenet of liberalism. At the political level, 
we recognize only a thin domain of normative facts and corresponding truths: those that are 
acceptable from the perspective of all reasonable comprehensive views. By contrast, we do 
not assume the existence of facts about comprehensive moral matters, such as matters of 
interpersonal morality, religion, and metaphysical foundations. Furthermore, we use certain 
level-specific concepts and categories in political theorizing, such as concepts of political 
obligation and permission, reasonableness in a public sense, and so on. These are distinct 
from (and at most partly overlap with) the concepts and categories employed in moral 
theorizing, such as moral obligation and permission and an array of richer notions in terms 
of which we express moral reasons. 
Faced with these claims, critics may raise an objection familiar from the literature 
on Political Liberalism (see, e.g., Callan 1997, chap. 2, Enoch 2017, and Arneson 2014; for 
discussion, see Daniels 1996). Is it not irrational or even schizophrenic 
• to accept that in the political realm, due to intractable disagreement, one should not 
appeal to comprehensive doctrines, and use thinner, political concepts and categories, 
• and yet to continue to hold on to those comprehensive doctrines privately? 
Consider, for example, a liberal Catholic anti-abortionist. Would it not be absurd for him or 
her to believe that, at the moral level, there is a fact about whether abortion involves killing 
                                               
5 Exceptions may be those liberals who view liberalism as a comprehensive moral doctrine, e.g., perfectionistic 
liberals. 
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a moral person and also to believe that, at the political level, there is no such fact?  
As Norman Daniels (1996, p. 152) puts the concern: “Can people say to themselves, 
‘Although I have fundamental values and beliefs that bear on this issue of behavior, I will 
refrain from raising them and consider only the reasons permitted by public reason?’ Is this 
moral double bookkeeping a kind of multiple moral personality disorder?”6 For those who 
share this worry, it might be tempting to offer one of the following suggestions, each of 
which is an alternative to the levels view.7 
• Moral uncertainty: Given intractable disagreement, we should all be uncertain about 
our views (cf. Barry 1995).8 The problems of political theory then require that we 
apply moral decision-making under uncertainty, instead of accepting the seemingly 
schizophrenic view that there are different normative facts at different levels. 
• Judgement suspension: Given intractable disagreement, the rational thing to do is to 
suspend judgement (see the discussion in Leland and van Wietmarschen 2012, p. 
745, and Enoch 2017).  If we suspend judgement, we are no longer disagreeing. 
Hence the problem of disagreement disappears, and with it, the associated 
schizophrenia of assuming different sets of normative facts at different levels (for 
discussion of these sceptical objections, see Quong 2011, chap. 8).  
In the following two subsections, we respond to each suggestion in turn.  
5.2.1. Moral uncertainty?  
What about treating intractable disagreement as an indicator of moral uncertainty? It would 
then seem appropriate to answer all normative questions about politics by applying our best 
theory of decision-making under uncertainty. On this picture, we may be uncertain about 
whether utilitarianism, prioritarianism, Kantianism, or some other moral theory is true, and 
so we may need to hedge our bets in deciding which political arrangements to recommend. 
Yet, it is assumed, there is a fact of the matter about the true moral theory. The limitations 
in political theory are then epistemic, not ontic, and we can uphold full-blown moral realism, 
even in politics. 
                                               
6 Note, however, that Daniels is unpersuaded by this critique. 
7 We thank Victor Tadros for discussion. For criticisms of the epistemic reading of Political Liberalism, see 
Enoch (2017).  
8 Barry (1995, p. 169) writes: “no conception of the good can justifiably be held with a degree of certainty that 
warrants its imposition on those who reject it”. 
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We think this proposal is not viable. First, it is not clear that our established theories 
of decision-making under uncertainty can easily apply to moral matters, where the 
uncertainty is not about empirical facts, but about the requirements of morality. To apply 
those theories, we would have to accomplish at least three things: 
• come up with an agreed specification of the set of possible normative worlds at the 
moral level; these would have to include one world in which utilitarianism is true, 
one in which Kantianism is true, one in which each religious view is true, and so on; 
• assign subjective probabilities to these possible normative worlds, such as 0.25 to 
the utilitarian world, 0.25 to the Kantian world, and so on, while making sure these 
numbers are meaningful; and 
• assign numerical utilities to the consequences of all possible choices (such as 
actions, policies, or institutional designs) in each possible normative world, where 
those utilities capture the moral value of each choice under the “true” moral theory 
in that world, while permitting comparability across different normative worlds; for 
instance, if lying is worse in a Kantian world than in a utilitarian one, then lying 
might correspond to a utility of -100 in the Kantian world and only to a utility -50 
in the utilitarian one. 
We suspect that, contrary to what some recent literature on moral uncertainty suggests, these 
three tasks pose insurmountable challenges (cf. Lockhart 2000). Of course, one could 
stipulatively postulate a utilitarian world, a Kantian world, a contractualist world, and so 
on, then assign some subjective probabilities to these worlds, and ask how good or bad, in 
numerical utility terms, various outcomes would be in each of them. This would seem to 
enable us to calculate the expected utility of various possible choices against the background 
of our moral uncertainty (for defences of such approaches, see MacAskill 2016 and 
Riedener 2015). However, whether this exercise is genuinely meaningful and whether it can 
be done in an agreeable way under conditions of pluralism are altogether different questions. 
The jury is still out on this. 
Second, even if we set these difficulties aside, we are left with the problem that 
people intractably disagree about decision-making—moral or otherwise—under 
uncertainty. Should we be expected utility maximizers? Maxi-minimizers (who try to 
achieve the best possible worst-case consequences)? Risk-weighted expected utility 
maximizers (Buchak 2014)? And if so, what should our risk attitude be? Or should we adopt 
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an altogether different decision procedure? In fact, people intractably disagree about the 
very question of whether the appropriate response to disagreement among competent 
thinkers is decreasing one’s degree of belief in one’s comprehensive moral view (see the 
literature on peer disagreement, as reviewed in Goldman and Blanchard 2015, sec. 3.4).  
In sum, adopting a framework of decision-making under uncertainty and selecting a 
particular decision procedure within that framework will reproduce the same problems we 
identified in connection with identifying the correct substantive answers to normative 
questions. The moment we settle for a certain procedure for making decisions under moral 
uncertainty, we impose that procedure on others who reasonably disagree with it, contrary 
to what we called the “core liberal commitment”.9 The moral-uncertainty response to the 
problem of intractable disagreement is therefore theoretically dubious and morally 
unappealing, at least from the liberal perspective with which we have started.10 
5.2.2. Suspending judgement?  
Let us turn to the second response to the “schizophrenia” worry, namely that, in the face of 
intractable disagreement, the rational response is to suspend judgement altogether. The 
problem of disagreement would then disappear: we would hold no views on any contested 
issues.  
This suggestion is at odds with our moral phenomenology. It would imply that 
virtually everyone is irrational in a pluralistic society. Given intractable disagreement about 
moral matters, we ought to suspend judgement, thereby abandoning most if not all of our 
moral commitments. But this is not what most people, including apparently very rational 
ones, do. A view that leads us to regard those we ordinarily consider rational as completely 
irrational is one of which we should be suspicious. 
The levels view tells us that we should suspend judgement only at the political level, 
by assuming a thinner set of normative facts at that level and using only political-level 
concepts and categories. This is faithful to our moral experience. As liberal-democratic 
citizens we accept that we shouldn’t impose our convictions on others in the face of 
                                               
9 Note that the levels view should not be interpreted as involving decision-making under moral uncertainty. 
According to the levels view, cases of intractable moral disagreement are not instances of uncertainty; rather, 
they are instances of indeterminacy. This is because, at the comprehensive moral level, the levels view does 
not instruct proponents of the competing moral doctrines to abandon their views. At the political level, by 
contrast, the levels view takes there to be no fact of the matter in such cases. So, we are not dealing with moral 
uncertainty at either of these levels. Furthermore, at the political level, the levels view does not impose any 
commitment to controversial moral facts on anyone. 
10 For comprehensive reservations about epistemic versions of political liberalism, see Enoch (2017). 
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intractable moral disagreement, but as private individuals we hold on to our contested 
convictions and shape our lives around them (Macedo 1995, p. 474).  
Consider again the example of a liberal Catholic who holds the following beliefs: at 
the comprehensive moral level, there is a fact about whether abortion involves killing a 
moral person; and at the political level, there is no such fact. Are these beliefs really in 
tension? Recall our earlier observation that, in medicine, there is no fact of the matter about 
whether one should pray for spiritual salvation, while there may be such a fact in morality 
or religion. This claim is unlikely to elicit any charges of schizophrenia. Now imagine you 
went to a judge or a government official—i.e., someone responsible for making public 
decisions—and asked them: “Does abortion involve killing a moral person?” Presumably, 
they would respond: “I am the wrong person to answer this question in my capacity as a 
public official. At most, I can say something about legal personhood. The law is silent about 
moral personhood; there is no legal fact of the matter about it.”  
This hypothetical dialogue puts pressure on the claim that there is something 
incoherent in holding that there are different facts at the moral and political levels. The 
burden of proof is on the objector to tell us why the official’s response is incoherent, when 
it seems obviously correct. And if this response is not incoherent, then neither is the liberal 
Catholic’s belief that while there is a fact about moral personhood at the comprehensive 
moral level, there is no such fact at the political one, which is similar to the level at which 
state officials and judges operate. 
Reservations about our argument are likely to be motivated by the temptation to 
collapse moral and political levels, or to suggest that the latter should “mirror” the former. 
This, however, is a substantive view about the structure of normative ontology, and one that 
suggests that normative ontology is “flatter”—less “multi-levelled”—than we have argued. 
Appeal to this substantive view, which is distinct from the levels view, is no response to our 
claim that the levels view is free from incoherence or schizophrenia.  
5.3. Ontological parsimony and the levels view 
The picture of normative ontology suggested by the levels view is also more in line with 
Occam’s Razor principle than its comprehensive rivals. Let us explain. Given the 
prominence of moral realism in philosophical debates, philosophers often assume that some 
comprehensive moral theory must be true. While it is widely accepted that we do not 
conclusively know which moral theory is true, the existence of a fact of the matter is seldom 
put into question by moral philosophers—at least outside anti-realist circles. However, the 
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assumption that there is a fact of the matter, which we must “merely” discover, is a 
demanding one, and it is far from obvious that this assumption should be the default, 
especially when it comes to politics. 
In science, but also in philosophical ontology in Occam’s tradition, the leading 
methodological principle is that we should not posit more features of reality—i.e., more 
facts, entities, or properties—than needed in order to account for the relevant evidence 
concerning the matter of interest. Suppose we are interested in the ontology of physics. 
Electromagnetic fields, for instance, were not part of the original Newtonian ontology of 
the world. Maxwell’s electrodynamics, however, showed that we need to invoke them as 
new unobservable features of the world in order to make sense of certain observable 
phenomena. For this reason, we now accept their reality. By contrast, the ether was an 
ingredient of reality postulated at some point, but it turned out to be explanatorily 
dispensable, and so we no longer believe that it exists. 
What does Occam’s Razor imply for the normative domain? Let us start with 
comprehensive moral questions. It may well be true that if we are interested in explaining 
what makes an action right or wrong (our matter of interest) and we take our personal 
comprehensive moral judgements as our “data points” (the relevant evidence), then an 
indispensability argument might be given for realism about certain normative facts. 
Specifically, it might be that, without positing a rich normative ontology, we would not be 
able to account for our normative “data” about comprehensive moral questions in an 
adequate manner. A rich ontology of moral facts might offer the best explanation of our 
personal moral landscape.  
But even if this correctly characterizes the methodology of moral theorizing, the 
matters of interest and relevant evidence are different in political theory. First, the matter of 
interest will now be political morality and social organization, as opposed to the sorts of 
moral questions within comprehensive morality. Second, while treating one’s personal 
judgements as relevant evidence may be defensible in matters of personal morality, it 
appears problematic once we turn to matters of public concern. Regarding public matters, 
“relevant evidence” should be publically ascertained. This implies that contested personal 
normative judgements won’t count as relevant data points in political theorizing. And so, 
those judgements will also fail to constitute data points whose explanation makes a richer 
normative ontology indispensable. 
These observations suggest that, at a political level, the kind of rich normative 
ontology that full-blown moral realists accept is hard to defend. At best, we might be able 
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to defend a less demanding form of normative realism, restricted to a thinner ontology of 
normative facts: facts concerning matters of social organization on which the evidence is 
publically ascertained. These are precisely the facts on which we can establish an 
overlapping consensus in Rawls’s sense. 
So, the question to ask is not “why should we accept that our political ontology is 
thin”, but “why not”? The burden of proof should fall on those who wish to posit more facts 
in order to address a given set of normative questions, not on those who wish to posit fewer 
facts, especially when the evidence for those facts is intractably contested.11 
5.4. An analogy 
Suppose the politics department of a university is hiring a new assistant professor in political 
theory (for a similar example, see Quong 2016). The department is split between analytic 
theorists and postmodernists, who have competing comprehensive views about what counts 
as good scholarship. The decision about whom to hire is of great public significance in the 
department: everyone has to live with it. Consider the following, rather different ways of 
conducting the hire.  
Procedure 1: Colleagues deliberate about whom to hire, each appealing to their own 
comprehensive views about excellence in research. The discussion turns nasty. Through the 
arguments they offer for and against hiring various candidates, faculty members end up 
making accusations at each other. The analytic theorists accuse their colleagues of 
sloppiness, charlatanism, and ideological pontificating. The postmodernists lament their 
colleagues’ parochialism, sophistry, and narrow-mindedness. No consensus is found. The 
top candidate for each side is deemed unappointable by the other. Resigned to the need to 
fill the position, the department votes. The analytic side narrowly wins. A new hire is 
imposed on the department for reasons many of its members find deeply objectionable.    
Procedure 2: In deliberating about whom to hire, colleagues with different 
comprehensive views look for common ground. Aware of their differences, they proceed 
by arguing from shared premises, abstracting away from their partisan views: the analytic 
theorists set aside the criterion of formal analysis, the postmodernists set aside the 
                                               
11 A referee has raised the following objection: “The opponent of levels is not positing more total facts—they 
are resisting the levels view and arguing that there’s just one level of normative facts and thus arguably fewer 
total facts. The proponent of levels is positing more total facts since they introduce more levels.” We disagree, 
insofar as we are here referring only to normative facts at the political level. At that level, the proponent of the 
level view is undeniably positing fewer facts. From the perspective of the political level, matters of 
comprehensive morality are simply left indeterminate. At the political level, there are no facts about them. 
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importance of deconstruction, and so on. They focus on what they have in common. For 
example, they all agree that publishing in some generally recognized journals is an 
achievement (though they disagree about more specialist venues). They all agree that 
positive student evaluations are prima facie evidence of good teaching. They all agree that 
it would be desirable to hire someone who can teach the history of political thought. The 
deliberation proceeds in a civil manner. Colleagues fail to reach consensus on how 
candidates should be ranked, but they agree about some of them being in principle 
appointable. The issue is put to a vote, and again—let’s suppose—an analytically oriented 
candidate is chosen. To be sure, the postmodernist group is disappointed, but not completely 
alienated. They can see some public reasons in support of the decision and feel that they 
have been treated respectfully by their colleagues.  
Intuitively, we hope readers will agree, Procedure 2 is superior to Procedure 1. We 
will comment on why that is in a moment. First, we would like to look at the ontological 
presuppositions of Procedure 2. Importantly, it is not the case that, for the hiring process, 
participants assume that there is a comprehensive truth about the right approach to political 
theory, but are uncertain about what that truth is: is it in line with postmodernism or with 
analytic methodology? If that were the case, the department would follow some procedure 
for decision-making under uncertainty. For instance, colleagues would assign certain 
probabilities to the correctness of the different methodological approaches and decide on 
that basis. But this is not what they do under Procedure 2.  
Instead, they refrain from assuming the existence of a fact of the matter about 
whether postmodernism or analytic theorizing is better. At the level of the department, they 
bracket off certain questions and assume a thinner class of facts about what constitutes good 
scholarship—facts that lie at the overlap between their different partisan views. Doing so 
does not prevent them from holding on to their comprehensive views in their own circles. 
At a deeper level, they each continue to believe that one way of doing research is superior 
to the other. But they acknowledge that comprehensive facts about research methodology 
cannot be assumed at the level of their pluralistic department. Procedure 2, then, 
presupposes an ontological structure akin to the levels view.  
Now why does Procedure 2 seem superior to Procedure 1? Several answers come to 
mind, which are analogous to the ones we have offered in the political case. First, Procedure 
2 is likely to be conducive to the good functioning of a department, by ensuring peace and 
stability. Procedure 1, by contrast, may lead to conflict and disaffection. Second, Procedure 
2 shows respect towards both sides of the debate, who reasonably disagree with each other. 
 
 
 23 
Of course, what counts as “reasonable” is often far from clear-cut; more on this below. Still, 
each side can see that the other consists of rational individuals acting in good faith. And 
each side can see the wrong involved in imposing a view on others based on reasons that 
those others consider deeply disagreeable. Third, given that the question “Whom should we 
hire?” can be answered independently of “deep facts” about research methodology, and 
given how contested that methodology is, Occam’s Razor principle suggests that we should 
not posit more facts about that matter than strictly necessary for departmental purposes. 
Procedure 2 does exactly that. 
6. Some implications  
We have argued that political theorizing should operate at a more coarse-grained level than 
moral theorizing and should be associated with a thinner ontology of normative facts. We 
now discuss two questions on which we have been silent so far. First, how should we 
determine the “political truth”, i.e., which normative facts should we posit at the political 
level? And second, what would the proposed approach imply for the role of the political 
theorist?  
6.1. How to determine the political truth 
On the levels view, what counts as “the political truth” depends on the society in question 
and its degree of reasonable pluralism.12 To develop this point, we must say more about the 
difficult notion of “reasonableness”. For present purposes, we adopt the following simple 
definition. A comprehensive moral view is “reasonable” if it is (i) so far unfalsified by 
incontestable evidence and (ii) compatible with basic liberal requirements, including the 
prohibition on coercing others in the name of contested comprehensive doctrines.13 
Reasonable pluralism, then, is the presence of different reasonable views in a given society. 
According to our definition, a variety of moral views can count as reasonable, including 
many familiar examples: utilitarianism, prioritarianism, various forms of egalitarianism, 
Kantianism, Aristotelian virtue ethics, and so on. Likewise, many (tolerant) religious views 
will qualify as reasonable.  
                                               
12 As should be clear, on the levels view, political theory need not dispense with the notion of truth (something 
that sets it apart from Rawls’s original version of political liberalism). Our perspective is therefore cognitivist. 
That said, the levels view remains agnostic about complex meta-ethical questions about the nature of the moral 
truth. Compare the discussions in Cohen (2009), Quong (2011, chap. 8), and Estlund (2012). 
13 Our characterization thus contains both a “thin” epistemic element and a “thin” moral one.  
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What we have given is a definition scheme. For example, we may use stricter or 
weaker standards of (i) the absence of falsification by incontestable evidence and of (ii) 
compatibility with basic liberal requirements. Our aim here is not to argue for a particular 
specification of (i) and (ii), but to make a structural point: whatever the criterion of 
reasonableness is, different degrees of reasonable pluralism will give rise to different 
specifications of the normative facts at the political level.  
Crucially, the political-level facts should be multiply realizable at the 
comprehensive moral level, i.e., supportable from the perspective of different competing 
reasonable moral views. The more such views we wish to accommodate, the thinner the 
resulting political-level facts will be. Ideally, we will be looking for what Rawls calls an 
“overlapping consensus” on political matters (Rawls 1996, Lecture IV). “Political truths” 
should lie in the intersection of the “moral truths” according to the different reasonable 
moral views present in the society in question.14 Proponents of different such views should 
each be able to endorse the agreed political principles from their own perspective: they may 
ultimately have their own comprehensive reasons for endorsing them, but they will still 
converge on the principles themselves.   
In line with these observations, there is not just one political level, but several, 
corresponding to different political domains. The political level associated with a nation 
state may admit a richer (“thicker”) specification of the normative facts than the political 
level associated with the international arena. Indeed, some settings, particularly the 
international one, may exhibit forms of pluralism that transcend the reasonable or that will 
qualify as “reasonable” only after significantly weakening the standards of reasonableness; 
such settings pose challenges for political liberalism (a point familiar from Rawls 1999). 
For example, the principles of justice that are likely to be supported by an overlapping 
consensus within the United Nations will be dramatically thinner than those that will be 
supported by an overlapping consensus within a nation state.15  
Ideally, the political-level facts should include facts about which procedures should 
be used for making collective decisions in the relevant domain when some issues need to 
be resolved on which there is no overlapping consensus. For instance, there is unlikely to 
                                               
14 This structure is also reminiscent of “supervaluationist” semantics for predicates which have competing 
admissible precisifications. 
15 Even within a given setting, such as a nation state, we may specify the political-level facts in thicker or 
thinner ways, depending on whether we are discussing constitutional arrangements, which should remain 
stable in the long term, or whether we are dealing with ordinary politics, where political commitments may be 
richer than at the constitutional level but more variable. 
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be an overlapping consensus on many policy issues such as the precise tax rate, and yet a 
binding decision may still be needed. In such a case, we would like to attain an overlapping 
consensus at least on the legitimacy of the decision procedure itself.    
6.2. The role of the political theorist 
On the levels view, the political theorist should formulate his or her arguments for a 
particular audience, namely everyone in the political domain. Political theory should not 
rely on the truth of claims that are reasonably contested within the society in question. This 
suggestion is familiar from the literature on political liberalism. Jonathan Quong (2011, p. 
242), for example, argues that “[w]hen we go beyond the limits of the political, and try to 
provide the deep metaethical or epistemic foundations for political values and their priority, 
we are no longer engaged in political philosophy suitable for a well-ordered liberal society”. 
In our terms, when we appeal to facts at a lower, more fine-grained moral level, we are no 
longer doing political theory “proper”, but moral theory applied to political questions. 
But what exactly does normative political theorizing involve? It involves seeking 
the truth at the political level. The levels view thus presupposes a cognitivist political meta-
ethics: it refers to normative truths at the political level. Yet those truths must be found in 
the overlap between different reasonable comprehensive doctrines and be expressible using 
political-level concepts and categories. This places constraints on the kinds of arguments 
political theorists may put forward. As Rawls already suggested in Political Liberalism, 
these constraints are akin to those faced by Supreme Court Justices, who must answer legal 
questions not by marshaling their deep moral convictions, but by appeal to a restricted set 
of public reasons, as given by the relevant body of law (see Rawls 1996, pp. 231 ff.; for 
discussion, see also Waldron 2007).   
Political theorists are not legal experts or judges. For them, identifying truths at the 
political level cannot be a matter of interpreting legal statutes, but it must be a matter of 
interpreting the public culture of the relevant society—another idea familiar from Rawls. 
Political theory, on this picture, needs to rely more heavily on empirical or sociological 
analysis, with the aim of interpreting the political-moral facts in the given society. This 
renders political theorizing more similar to the kind of interpretive exercise proposed by 
thinkers such as Michael Walzer (1987).16 Perhaps surprisingly, then, a truly liberal 
                                               
16 See also the so-called “practice-dependent” approach, as discussed in Sangiovanni (2008). Note that this 
would not remove disagreement from political theorizing. Different theorists are likely to defend different 
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approach requires that we re-orient political theory towards the kind of interpretive, 
sociologically informed methodology associated with “communitarian” approaches.  
Many political theorists will baulk at this suggestion. This reaction may be, in part, 
due to the prospect of no longer having unconstrained freedom to invoke the rich 
methodology of moral theory, ranging from appeals to contested philosophical premises and 
following an argument “wherever it takes us” to the use of far-fetched, sometimes 
outlandish thought experiments and other intuition pumps. Political theory according to the 
levels view is a more soberly disciplined activity.  
However, might one not insist, with Jeremy Waldron, that “it ought to be someone’s 
job to figure out whether [for example] torture is objectively wrong in all circumstances and 
why”? And might one not agree with Waldron (2015, p. 124) that “[i]t is hard to see that 
this is not a task for political philosophers”? “[I]f it is not their task, whose is it?” We agree 
that it should be someone’s task to think about these issues, but if what ultimately explains 
the wrongness of torture is a comprehensive moral fact, then the levels view suggests that 
it is the task of the moral (not the political) theorist to investigate it. However, there may 
well be a political-level truth concerning the wrongness of torture, which can be 
underwritten by a variety of different comprehensive moral truths. The political theorist 
would have to investigate the (im)permissibility of torture from that political perspective, 
not the comprehensive moral one.  
Two further concerns may be put forward. The first is that doing political theory in 
line with the levels view involves a status-quo bias. The second is that refusing to engage 
with deeply contested comprehensive doctrines is disrespectful towards politically engaged 
citizens who fight for justice in the name of those doctrines. 
The first worry—that the levels view is status-quo biased—echoes a complaint that 
liberals often raised against communitarians in the 1980s and 1990s. To defend the levels 
view, we begin by noting that a bias towards the status quo need not be bad: it depends on 
what the status quo is. As we have argued, our version of the levels view is meant to apply—
like the later Rawls’s—to liberal-democratic societies. So, the relevant status quo should 
ideally be one that is acceptable by liberal standards. Of course, the objector will insist that 
if political theory can only appeal to what “is already there” in a liberal public culture, 
resources will be limited for advocating progressive reform—for making a liberal society 
                                               
interpretations of the relevant overlapping consensus, given that such consensus needs to be unearthed, and is 
far from transparent. 
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morally better. We find this worry misplaced, at least if one subscribes to what we called 
the “core liberal conviction”. The worry presupposes that invoking the truth of contested 
moral doctrines in political argument could lead to a better society. But justifying reforms 
by reference to contested views is tantamount to renouncing liberalism, at least on our 
understanding of it. A society that appeals to comprehensive moral doctrines in order to 
justify state coercion is one in which individuals are being pushed around in the name of 
partisan and contested views. This is not a truly liberal society, and thus hardly morally 
superior from a liberal perspective. That said, progressive reforms can be politically justified 
if the status quo exhibits inconsistencies or contains illiberal elements, for instance if some 
existing laws or policies tacitly presuppose contested moral doctrines. Moreover, 
progressive reforms can be justified if the overlapping consensus itself shifts. 
The second objection, put forward by David Enoch, suggests that by refusing to 
engage with the substance of deep moral disagreements, the political theorist treats his or 
her fellow citizens in a disrespectful, patronizing manner. Focusing only on facts at the 
political level seems equivalent to treating “some of the most deeply held beliefs of those 
engaged in the relevant disagreement as if they were mere preferences: For with mere 
preferences, arguably going second-order and impartial is precisely the way to go, and 
certainly engaging them in argument doesn’t make much sense” (Enoch 2015, p. 136). There 
is no fact of the matter about which preferences are right and which are wrong. Preferences 
are not cognitive attitudes; they are conative. Similarly, so the objection goes, assuming that 
there is no fact of the matter about which comprehensive moral view is right fails to take 
seriously the proponents of such views.  
We think that the levels view can be defended against this critique. The view does 
not deny the existence of facts about deep moral questions altogether. It simply asserts that 
those facts do not belong to the political level; they belong to a more fine-grained moral 
level. The levels view can therefore not be accused of treating fundamental moral 
commitments as if they were mere preferences. It is precisely because fundamental moral 
commitments are very important that it would be disrespectful to impose them on others 
who reasonably disagree with them and to use them to justify public policy. 
7. Conclusion 
We have suggested a way of demarcating the normative ontologies of moral and political 
theory, based on a “levels view” inspired by the philosophy of science and Political 
Liberalism. We have argued that this view is consistent with the aims of political theorizing 
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in pluralistic societies, that it honours liberal convictions, and that it respects methodological 
principles of parsimony.  
 We conclude with some comments on the point and limits of our analysis. First, 
although we have framed the discussion around the distinction between moral and political 
theory, labels are not so important. Our interest is not in the question of what should be 
called “moral” or “political theory”, but in distinguishing between different levels of 
normative analysis. Which labels we attach to them is secondary. What matters is 
vindicating the claim that, when it comes to justifying coercive state policies and binding 
public decisions, we may appeal only to a restricted set of normative facts and use political-
level concepts and categories rather than comprehensive moral ones. This is the form of 
normative political theorizing we recommend. 
 Second, our defence of the levels view in its politically liberal form may raise the 
question of how it relates to the “domain” and “core values” views, and whether it really 
competes with them. After all, the levels view also implies that political theories (i) are 
concerned with the domain of public decisions (in line with the domain view) and (ii) deal 
with a distinctive set of normative facts (in line with the core-values view). So, what is 
special about the levels view? The view is special insofar as it does not merely stipulate that 
features (i) or (ii) define the difference between political and moral theory, as in the case of 
the domain or core-values views, but instead combines the two features and relates them to 
a more systematic approach to normative ontology.   
 Third, even those who are sympathetic to our version of the levels view may be 
skeptical about its real-world applicability. In the real world—especially when the 
overlapping consensus is rather thin—we often run out of arguments if we do not appeal to 
comprehensive moral convictions (see, e.g., Reidy 2000). This concern is legitimate, yet it 
does not invalidate the levels view. We have offered an ideal account of the facts to which 
we may appeal in normative political arguments. In the real world, we can at best 
approximate this ideal. We should appeal to as few comprehensive moral considerations as 
possible when we offer public justifications. In short, we should try to justify normative 
political claims in the spirit of the ideal, and the more a society departs from that ideal, the 
less liberal it will be. Nothing as neat and clear-cut as the ideal itself is likely to be realized 
in practice. But this does not invalidate the levels view as a regulative ideal.  
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